In the mid to late 1980′s, the international political landscape was undergoing a vast reconstruction. Freedom was no longer a buzz-word, paid lip service by world leaders. It was an expected and deserved right. It was necessary. Predicated by a change in world-wide diplomacy by the United States, which no longer saw a need to tolerate oppressive regimes, and the Soviet Union, mired in economic troubles throughout the Eastern Bloc, the people of oppressed communist lands were finding the courage to rise up and affect change. Years of hard-line ideology were coming to an abrupt end, and it seemed as if those who once sheltered this hard-line attitude were just as willing to see it go as those who had been under its oppressive rule for so many years. Years of intense political battle had placed their scar on the landscape of Eastern Europe, and all at once, it seemed that everyone noticed the wall, the wall that had become a symbol of everything bad, the wall that had assumed all the sins of its broken political past, the wall that needed to be broken in effigy of the oppression that its keepers promoted. It was by this wall, that one man stood with compassionate force and finally spoke what everyone was thinking: “Tear down this wall”.
At the time it fell, the Berlin Wall had come to be seen by the West as an oppressive force, acting against the freedom of the people, holding out prosperity and keeping in its prisoners mired in poverty, hunger, and solitude. However, up until the late 1980′s, little was ever done to bring about its demise. In fact, many historians agree that, at the time of its creation, western allies saw the wall as a an acceptable compromise to the prospect of entering into military conflict with the Soviet controlled Communist Bloc. President Kennedy said of the border wall, “[it] is not a very nice solution but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war” (Smyser, 106). This year, being the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, I decided dig a little deeper into the story of the wall. I set out to learn how the wall came about in the first place. More importantly, I wanted to know what caused it to fall. I hoped to find that the will of the people had simply become too great and that humanitarian sacrifice triumphed over the cause of some ideology. I wanted to prove that all it took was the taste of freedom to topple tyranny. In my research, I was presented with four primary and influential players. The first two players enter in the early 1960′s: President of the United States, John F. Kennedy and First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev. 1961 was a scary time. People were worried that the United States and the Soviet Union would go to war. The massive and lasting world-wide implications of war between these two superpowers were enormous, and therefore the Berlin Wall was viewed by the West as a necessary buffer between the allied West and the Communist Bloc. The second set of leading players in the life of the Wall entered in the 1980′s: President of the United States, Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. It was these two men, one who brought about a new international call for freedom, and the other who loosened his grip, that finally ended the era of the Berlin Wall. These men changed perceptions that the wall was a necessary buffer, and showed that the Berlin Wall was an inconvenient truth that continually impeded diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Following the 1948 Soviet blockade of West Berlin, the first trappings of the Berlin Wall began taking shape in the early 1950 in the form of a cleared section of the city along the demarkation line separating East and West Berlin (Thompson). However, the physical concrete wall did not come into existence until after the Vienna Summit of 1961. It was during this summit that Nikita Khrushchev threatened that the Soviet Union would unilaterally end the rights of the United States and its allies in West Germany (JFK In History: The Cold War in Berlin ). The United States had made a commitment to protect the rights of the West German people and its allies, and so President Kennedy responded by strengthening America’s defenses both at home and abroad. On July 25 1961, Kennedy said to the American people,
“So long as the communists insist that they are preparing to end by themselves unilaterally our rights in West Berlin and our commitments to its people, we must be prepared to defend those rights and those commitments. We will at times be ready to talk, if talk will help. But we must also be ready to resist with force, if force is used upon us. Either alone would fail. Together, they can serve the cause of freedom and peace” (JFK In History: The Cold War in Berlin).
Not surprisingly, soon after the Vienna Summit, Soviet leaders found that a massive influx of educated East German workers were leaving East Germany for the West. Seemingly spurred on by the benefits of American security and democracy, by August of 1961, nearly 2600 Easterners per day escaped to the West (Blumenfeld). Commenting on this symbolic and timely mass movement, then Vice President Lyndon Johnson noted that,
“Despite every instrument of force and propaganda, despite every asset of German skill and German resources, the Communists have not been able to create a life to which men can commit their talents, their faith and the future of their children” (Blumenfeld).
Seeking to abruptly stem flow of intelligent refugees, popularly known as “brain drain”, communist leaders imposed a ban on travel from East Germany to West Germany, and revoked registration papers of most Easterners who currently held jobs in West Germany. Finally, on August 13, 1961, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany’s Soviet controlled form of self-governance) began construction on a concrete barrier dividing East and West Berlin. Along the wall, they posted guards with orders to shoot anyone who dared traverse it without permission. Later, after finding that one wall did not adequately serve to deter free emigration, the Soviets built a second wall 100 yards inside the original, creating a “no man’s land” guarded by armed men, dogs on runs and even land mines. This area quickly earned a gruesome and murderous reputation. In all, 263 people are known to have lost their lives attempting to cross this zone (JFK In History: The Cold War in Berlin).
While public outrage over the wall never simmered, the Cold War took the attention of the two leaders away, and soon the Berlin Wall was no longer in the public spotlight. Successive summits were held between successive leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, however U.S. policy on the Berlin Wall didn’t change, and therefore very little diplomatic ground was made on the issue. That is, until the early 1980′s when President Ronald Reagan turned his attention not only to the human rights violations occurring at the Berlin Wall, but to the vast human oppression occurring throughout the entire Communist Bloc. With his predecessor’s memories of Khrushchev and his successor Leonid Brezhnev very clear in his mind, Reagan made is opinion clear in his remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in 1982;
“In the nuclear era, the major powers bear a special responsibility to ease these sources of conflict and to refrain from aggression. And that’s why we’re so deeply concerned by Soviet conduct. Since World War II, the record of tyranny has included Soviet violation of the Yalta agreements leading to domination of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the Berlin Wall” (Remarks in New York, New York, Before the United Nations General Assembly…).
Reagan backed up his sharp rhetoric by seeking no diplomatic advances with the Soviet Union until after Brezhnev was out of power. In 1985 however, the newly appointed Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev seemed to be a rational leader with clear intentions, and Reagan saw that the political climate would now allow effective diplomacy. In the summer of 1985, Reagan noted in his diary, “Gorbachev has passed the word that he’d like to establish a private channel of communication. We tried to get such a thing with his predecessors & couldn’t make it. I gave the word to proceed” (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Foundation, 343). Reagan knew that the Soviet economic crisis and the resulting domestic pressure was beginning to mount on Gorbachev’s regime. During his 1982 dealings with the Soviets, Reagan wrote,
“I suggested that yes we could negotiate a long term grain contract with the Soviets but shouldn’t we get some concessions re Latin Am., Afghanistan, etc. The Soviets are, after all, in deep ec. trouble & need our help desperately” (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Foundation, 74)
Reagan knew that the time for talks had come. Speaking about the President’s choice to invite Gorbachev into talks, national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane said, “In the past four years here in the United States, and more broadly in the West, we have experienced a political, economic and social renewal of historic proportion, America has regained its moorings, it is leading, and peace is more secure” (Cooper).
The stage was set for an epic clash of superpowers. A media fueled exchange of propaganda preceded the overdue meeting. At the heart of Gorbachev’s agenda was Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a space based defense program, dubbed “Star Wars” by its opponents, aimed at intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles using a network of satellites orbiting the earth. SDI was expected to cost nearly $33 billion dollars in the first six years and Gorbachev planned to use it as his bargaining chip (Cooper). Gorbachev claimed that SDI was not a defensive weapon, and therefore research alone violated the terms of the previous SALT treaties signed by Presidents Nixon and Carter. Gorbachev contended that SALT was the only arms neutrality agreement observed by the Soviet Union, and as such, its violation meant that neither party had any obligation to adhere it. As a result the arms race was back on. Further, in an attempt to turn the tables, Gorbachev offered that he would agree to a 50% cut in both sides’ nuclear weapons, a greater reduction than was initially negotiated, if Reagan would give up on SDI (Cooper). Reagan, knowing that Gorbachev’s only response to SDI was to embark upon a costly research program of his own, quickly dismissed the offer. Reagan focused his agenda on the human toll. Reagan insisted that regional conflicts in which the Soviets were actively involved as aggressors, be resolved. Using Western trade relations as the dangling carrot, Reagan worked to introduce capitalism into the Soviet controlled Communist Block knowing that a domino effect would result in one state-controlled economic collapse after another. Now Reagan only needed to find the first brick to topple.
The end result of the summit was a new, more open, dialog, but Reagan knew there was still more ground to cover. Upon returning from Geneva, President Reagan warned a Joint Session of Congress,
“I have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that we must reduce the mistrust and suspicions between us if we are to do such things as reduce arms, and this will take deeds, not words alone” (Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress…).
Two years later, under an air of impatience, the President made a historic trip to Berlin on the city’s 700th birthday. It was there, at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin that the President addressed a world-wide audience and leveled with the Soviet leader;
“There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” (Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin June 12, 1987).
It would be another three years before the two leaders would sign a lasting agreement, finally putting an end the arms race that embodied the Cold War. However, Reagan’s pointed words that day showed that the era of the Berlin Wall was coming quickly to a close. Reagan’s strategy of trust and openness led to a trust between the United States and the Soviet Union that only comes with predicatability. His direct, plain spoken communication style helped him build a relationship with Soviet leaders, ease mistrust between the Communists and the Western Allies, and ultimately ease the tensions of the Cold War. Reagan sensed that he was leading an entire ideology on an excursion through uncharted waters. Together, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbechev engineered a new era of lasting peace between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Works Cited
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